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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Plaintiff/Appellant PDC Consulting Inc. (hereafter "PDC") filed its Notice of 
Appeal on October 5, 2006. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)0) and 4, Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court properly act within its discretion when it dismissed PDC' s 
complaint after PDC failed to oppose a motion to dismiss and after PDC had failed, within 
the dates and extensions given by the court, to renew its denied motion to set aside the 
parties' April 15, 2001 settlement agreement? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court's dismissal of a case under Rule 41(b) is a decision within the 
broad discretion of the trial court. Country Meadows v. Dep 't of Health, 851 P.2d 1212,1215 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368,1370 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). See also, Grundmann v. Williams & 
Peterson, 685 P.2d 538, 538 (Utah 1984). An appellate court, therefore, "will not interfere 
with that decision unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion and that 
there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought." Country Meadows, at 1214 (quoting 
Charlie Brown Constr., at 1370 (citing Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 
1324 (Utah 1980)). The issue was preserved in the district court as evidenced in R. 732. 
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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following State of Utah statutory provisions are relevant to the disposition 
of this appeal: 
Rule 41, Utah R. Civ. P., provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a 
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against 
h im. . . . 
Rule 7(c)(1), Utah R. Civ. P., provides in pertinent part: 
Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff PDC filed suit on April 6, 2001 alleging claims against its former 
employee, defendant Jared Porter. The parties entered into a lengthy written and signed 
settlement agreement nine days later, April 15, 2001. The settlement agreement secured 
release of Mr. Porter and dismissal of PDC's case, in exchange for disclosures by Porter. 
PDC apparently believed that such disclosures would enable it to file and pursue claims 
against corporate entities. 
After Mr. Porter made full disclosure, including submitting to fourteen hours 
of deposition by PDC, PDC was disappointed that the disclosures did not support the claims 
it had hoped to pursue against others. PDC then alleged to the court that Jared Porter had 
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induced PDC into settlement by fraud and indicated its desire to proceed with its underlying 
lawsuit against Mr. Porter. However, the court explained, and PDC agreed that the lawsuit 
had been eclipsed by the settlement. PDC would first have to secure an order setting aside 
the settlement before it would be able to proceed with its lawsuit. 
Twenty-one months then passed without any motion by PDC to challenge the 
settlement. Tired of the matter lingering on and desiring the dismissal of the case to which 
PDC had agreed in the settlement, Mr. Porter moved to enforce the settlement agreement, 
submitting proof of his compliance with all settlement terms. PDC responded by finally 
filing a motion to set aside the settlement and submitting its counsel's affidavit to raise issues 
about Mr. Porter's fulfillment of settlement terms. The court denied the motions, finding 
disputed issues of fact, and telling the parties that resolution of the issues would require 
hiring of experts and a lengthy evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that the case had 
been inactive for over 2 years, even though PDC had claimed that material breaches of the 
settlement agreement by Mr. Porter had occurred in June and July 2001. The court noted that 
PDC had offered no explanation for its delay. 
Subsequently, PDC did nothing on the case to set aside the settlement 
agreement, contrary to court-established deadlines for challenging the settlement. Five years 
after the case had settled, defendant Porter then filed a motion to dismiss for PDC's failures 
to prosecute the case and challenge the settlement agreement within the deadlines established 
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by the court. PDC did not oppose the motion to dismiss, and on September 6,2006 the court 
dismissed the case with prejudice. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The material course of proceedings is as follows: 
April 6, 2001 PDC files a complaint and a motion for temporary restraining 
order ("TRO") against its former employee, defendant Jared 
Porter, alleging various claims arising out of PDC's employment 
of Mr. Porter. RR. 34-1, 217-15. 
April 15, 2001 Following replevin of Jared Porter's personal laptop computer 
and other property, PDC and Jared Porter execute a settlement 
agreement securing release of Porter and dismissal of PDC's 
lawsuit through Porter's cooperation in making disclosures, 
including disclosure of other entities that PDC might be able to 
sue. RR. 671-654. 
June 14, 2001 Jared Porter submits to seven hours of deposition in fulfillment 
of the terms of the settlement agreement. R. 670 f 7. 
June 18,2001 PDC's counsel appears at a rescheduled TRO hearing, of which 
defense counsel was not given notice. PDC's counsel tells the 
court, "We were in depositions last Thursday on this matter. We 
have a settlement probably I think. But I want to go ahead and 
set it for an evidentiary hearing." R. 736, p. 3:14-16. The court 
sets a hearing for August 14, 2001. RR. 302, 303. 
June 29, 2001 Jared Porter submits to an additional seven hours of deposition 
in fulfillment of the terms of the settlement agreement. R. 670 
17. 
August 14, 2001 Upon learning of the parties' settlement at the hearing set by 
PDC, the court states there is no purpose for an evidentiary 
hearing, since the case has settled. R. 737 p. 24:14-25:19, 
36:22-37:2, 52:24-53:8. Having failed to find other entities to 
sue, PDC expresses an intent to challenge the settlement 
agreement. R. 737, 7:21-23. PDC acknowledges that the 
settlement agreement governs and that PDC cannot proceed on 
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August 14, 2001-
May 9, 2003 
April 9, 2003 
May 10,2003 
November 3,2003 
its lawsuit unless and until PDC gets the settlement set aside. 
R. 737 p. 24:14-25:19, 36:22-37:2, 52:24-53:8. 
Over the following twenty-one months PDC fails to make any 
motion to set aside or otherwise challenge the settlement 
agreement. 
Tired of the matter lingering on and desiring the dismissal to 
which PDC had agreed in the settlement, Jared Porter moves to 
enforce the settlement agreement and submits proof of his full 
compliance with all settlement terms. RR. 310, 338, 428. 
PDC responds to Jared Porter's motion by filing a motion to set 
aside the settlement agreement and attaching an affidavit of 
plaintiffs counsel to dispute defendant's fulfillment of 
settlement obligations. RR. 366, 373, 387. 
The court issues a ruling denying the parties' motions in regard 
to the settlement and states, "It is this Court's opinion that a 
lengthy evidentiary hearing is probably implicated, that experts 
would need to be employed, and that each party might need to 
seek new legal counsel."1 R. 612. Significantly, the court also 
notes, 
This case has been inactive for over 2 years even 
though plaintiff claims that material breeches of 
the settlement agreement by defendant occurred 
as early as June and July of 2001. Plaintiff has 
offered no explanation for this delay. 
November 4, 2003-
November 29, 2004 
R. 615, If 2. 
The following year, PDC again makes no effort to challenge the 
settlement. 
November 30, 2004 The court holds an order to show cause hearing requiring the 
parties to appear and show cause why the case should not be 
]The court stated this because Mr. Ady and defendant's prior attorney, Jack Pate, were 
material witnesses to compliance with settlement terms. RR 552, 671. 
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November 30, 2004-
February26,2005 
dismissed. R. 624. The court orders that the parties have 90 
days to conduct discovery on settlement issues and then file "any 
and all dispositive motions in regard to their settlement 
agreement." R. 630. 
PDC does nothing during the 90-day settlement discovery and 
challenge period. R. 732, p. 6:1-8. 
February 27,2005 
February 27, 2005-
April 30, 2005 
PDC requests that Jared Porter stipulate to an additional 60-day 
settlement discovery period, until April 30, 2005, to which Mr. 
Porter agrees. PDC Addendum B, R.732, 6:9-14, R. 632. 
PDC again does nothing during the additional 60-day period and 
never renews its motion to set aside the parties' settlement 
agreement. PDC Addendum B, R.732,6:9-14. 
April 30, 2005-
April 3, 2006 
PDC does nothing on the case. 
April 4,2006 
April 28,2006 
The court again holds an order to show cause hearing requiring 
the parties to appear and show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed. R. 637. PDC's counsel attends. The court 
mistakenly believes that the parties have stipulated through 
April 30, 2006 to file dispositive motions on the settlement, 
when the extension had actually expired one-year prior to that 
time. PDC Addendum B, R. 732 pp. 20,22, PDC Addendum A, 
R. 733, p. 6, R. 632. The court orders submission of a new 
scheduling order or a certificate of readiness for trial by April 
30, 2006 or the case will be dismissed. PDC Addendum A, R. 
733, p. 6. (Emphasis added). 
Even though PDC had never again attempted to obtain an order 
setting aside the settlement agreement, and even though there 
has been no litigation of PDC's claims, PDC files a certificate 
of readiness for trial. R. 643. 
May 8,2006 Defendant objects to PDC's certificate of readiness for trial and 
moves to dismiss the case since PDC failed to challenge the 
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June 6,2006 
July 3, 2006 
August 9,2006 
August 10,2006 
September 6, 2006 
settlement within the time and extensions of time given by the 
court to challenge the settlement. RR. 682-644. Defendant 
serves the motion to dismiss on May 8, 2006 by both U.S. mail 
and by facsimile. RR. 673, 683, 684, 685. 
PDC fails to respond to Jared Porter's motion to dismiss and 
Porter submits the motion for decision, asking the court to 
dismiss the case since plaintiff has filed no opposition to the 
motion. R. 689. That request to submit for decision was served 
on the Plaintiff, also on June 6, 2006. R. 687. 
Nearly two months have passed and PDC still files no 
opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court schedules a 
hearing for August 10, 2006 on the motion to dismiss. R. 692. 
Three months have now elapsed since defendant filed his motion 
to dismiss and PDC still has filed no opposition. 
The court hears the parties' arguments on the motion to dismiss 
and dismisses the case because PDC had been given plenty of 
time and opportunity, but failed to challenge the settlement, 
and because PDC failed to oppose defendant's motion to 
dismiss. PDC Addendum A, R. 732, 19:13-24:8. 
The court enters an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint with 
prejudice for the reasons stated by the court in the August 10, 
2006 hearing, including that plaintiff had failed to prosecute the 
case, plaintiff had failed to timely renew its denied motion to set 
aside the parties' April 15,2001 settlement agreement within the 
dates and extensions given by court and opposing counsel, and 
plaintiff had failed to timely oppose defendant's motion to 
dismiss. PDC Addendum C, R. 730-729: PDC Addendum A, R. 
732, 19:13-24:8. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Defendants' motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the case had 
settled on April 15, 2001 and, while PDC had expressed a desire to challenge the parties' 
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settlement agreement, PDC had failed to take action within the time and time extensions 
provided by the court for PDC to attempt to set the settlement aside. RR. 689-683,682-644. 
2. In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court first dealt with the question 
of the order-to-show-cause hearing on April 4,2006. PDC Addendum B, R. 732,19:19-24. 
3. The court noted that defense counsel, Mr. Raty, had mistakenly gone to 
the Prove courthouse, but this was not significant, because counsel who has no objection to 
the case being dismissed, need not appear. Id. 20:1-6. 
4. The court noted that it had reviewed the case file in preparation for the 
August 10, 2006 motion to dismiss hearing, and stated that at the April 4, 2006 order-to-
show-cause hearing the court had been under the mis-impression that the parties' stipulation 
for continuance of settlement discovery was still in effect, when the extension had actually 
expired nearly one year prior to that time. Id. 20:7-12, 22:18-25, R. 733, p. 6, R. 632. 
5. The court's mis-impression is revealed in the following language from 
the April 4, 2006 hearing: 
Okay. And then there's an extension, there's an agreement for an 
extension of time to April 30th in the file, 2005. So looks like you've 
agreed to, to that you have time a, until April 30th to complete 
discovery. That a, stipulated extension remains in place. And a, I'll 
order that a notice of readiness for trial be filed after that. Sounds like 
you have some more time. Then if I don't receive a certificate of 
readiness for trial or some other scheduling order by April 30th the case 
will be dismissed. 
PDC Addendum A, R. 733, p. 6. (emphasis added). 
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6. Then at the August 10,2006 motion-to-dismiss hearing, the court said, 
''Unfortunately, that series of events required the defendant to file the present motion to 
address matters that were unable, he was unable to present at the order to show cause 
hearing." PDC Addendum A, Id. 20:7-16. 
7. The court noted that PDC had filed no timely response to defendant's 
motion to dismiss, but the court had scheduled an unopposed motion to dismiss for hearing 
"to give both parties an opportunity to appear and to discuss the issues that could have been 
presented at the order to show cause hearing in April of 2006 but were not because of a, 
counsel's traveling to the wrong courtroom by mistake." Id. 20:17-25. 
8. After the parties had argued, the court again noted that it had reviewed 
the case history, including that the complaint was filed in April 2001, the parties reached a 
written settlement agreement on April 15, 2001, that defendant submitted to a lengthy 
deposition pursuant to the settlement agreement, and that approximately two years then 
passed before motions were made on the settlement, whereupon Judge Davis ruled on 
November 2003 that, "A lengthy evidentiary hearing is probably implicated, that experts 
would need to be employed, and that each party might need to seek new legal counsel." Id. 
21:1-18. The court also quoted Judge Davis' ruling, stating, 
This case has been inactive for over 2 years even though plaintiff 
claims that material breeches of the settlement agreement by defendant 
occurred as early as June and July of 2001. Plaintiff has offered no 
explanation for this delay. 
Id. 22:1-6, R. 615, U 2. 
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9. The court noted that the next hearing occurred a little more than one 
year later on November 30,2004, after the case had been reassigned, when the court issued 
an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. PDC 
Addendum B, R. 732, 22:7-11. At that time, the court ordered that any and all dispositive 
motions relating to the settlement agreement be filed within 90 days of November 30,2004, 
which period was extended by counsel for an additional 60 days to April 30,2005. Id. 22:11 -
14. 
10. The court then noted that another order-to-show-cause hearing was 
scheduled for April 4, 2006, one year after the April 30, 2005 expiration of the extended 
deadline for dispositive motions on the settlement agreement, and, again, that the court was 
under the misknpression that the stipulated extension ran to April 30, 2006. Id. 22:18-22. 
The court stated that because of its misimpression, it had ordered that plaintiff file a 
scheduling order or a certificate of readiness for trial. Id. 22:20-25. 
11. The court then noted the arguments of the parties, including defendant's 
argument that plaintiff had ample opportunity to challenge the settlement agreement, that the 
court and defendant had granted extensions to the plaintiff to allow the settlement to be 
challenged, but that plaintiff had failed to challenge the settlement agreement. Id. 23:1-11. 
The court also noted plaintiffs argument that granting the motion to dismiss would, in effect, 
grant a viability to the settlement agreement, when Judge Davis had previously ruled that 
genuine issues of fact would preclude such a ruling. Id. 23:12-18. The court noted 
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defendant's reply, that it had never been the defendant's burden to challenge the settlement 
agreement, that it has always been defendant's view that the settlement agreement was in 
place, and that it was the burden of the party seeking to set aside the settlement agreement 
to gather any discovery on the matter and then move to set it aside. Id. 23:19-24:1. 
12, Having reviewed the file and considered the parties' arguments, the 
court entered an order on September 6,2006, dismissing Plaintiff s complaint with prejudice 
for the reasons stated by the court in the August 10,2006 hearing, including that plaintiff had 
failed to prosecute the case, plaintiff had failed to timely renew its denied motion to set aside 
the parties' April 15, 2001 settlement agreement within the dates and extensions given by 
court and opposing counsel, and plaintiff had failed to timely oppose defendant's motion to 
dismiss. Id. 24:2-5; PDC Addendum C, R. 730-729. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court has broad discretion in dismissing a case under Rule 41(b), 
Utah R. Civ. P. for failure to prosecute, abide by court order, or abide the the rules of civil 
procedure. The court dismissed PDC's complaint for failing to challenge the settlement 
within the time allotted by the court, for failing to prosecute its case, and for failing to oppose 
a motion to dismiss. On appeal of a Rule 41 (b) motion to dismiss, the appellant must carry 
the burden of showing justifiable excuse for the failures leading to dismissal, and show that 
the district court clearly abused its broad discretion. PDC has failed to carry its burdens on 
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appeal, since it offered no excuses for its failures, and since it did not demonstrate a clear 
abuse of the district court's broad discretion. 
PDC could not have met its burden on appeal even had it tried, since the record 
reveals ample grounds to support the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the 
case. The parties entered into a settlement agreement shortly after PDC filed suit on April 
6, 2001. Thereafter, PDC agreed with the court that it would have to obtain a court order 
setting aside the settlement, if it wanted to proceed with the lawsuit underlying the 
settlement. PDC failed to prosecute its challenge to the settlement and failed to obtain a 
court order setting aside the settlement within the time allotted by the court. Five years after 
the settlement, Mr. Porter moved to dismiss the case with prejudice for PDC's failures to 
timely challenge the settlement and prosecute its case. The motion was unopposed by PDC 
and the court properly entered dismissal on September 6, 2006. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ACTED WITHIN 
ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PDC'S COMPLAINT 
FOR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND PROSECUTE THE CASE, 
The real issue before the court is whether the district court properly acted 
within its discretion in dismissing PDC's complaint under Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P., as a 
result of PDC's failure to timely oppose Jared Porter's motion to dismiss, its failure to 
challenge the parties' settlement agreement within the times and extensions given by the 
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court, and its failure to prosecute its case. Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P., states in pertinent 
part, 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or 
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or 
any claim of action against him. 
Regarding the district court's authority to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b), the 
supreme court has stated, "[T]he trial court should have a reasonable latitude of discretion 
in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to the rules 
and directions of the court, without justifiable excuse." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975). Under appellate court 
precedents, the appellant, in this case PDC has the burden on appeal to show a justifiable 
excuse for the failures that led to dismissal and that the court clearly abused its discretion in 
dismissing the case. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109 at [^28 , 46 P.3d 753, Country 
Meadows, at 1214-15, Morton v. Continental Baking Company, 938 P.2d271 (Utah 1997), 
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). The Utah Court of Appeals stated, "The 
burden is on the party 'attacking a dismissal for failure to prosecute [to] offer a reasonable 
excuse for its lack of diligence."5 Country Meadows, at 1215. In the case at bar, PDC has 
failed to provide any excuse for its failures and also failed to show that the court clearly 
abused its discretion. Furthermore, PDC could not show this, since there is ample evidence 
in the record which establishes that the district court acted properly within its discretion in 
dismissing the case. 
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As set forth above, PDC had entered into a settlement agreement with 
defendant Porter shortly after filing its lawsuit in April 2001. PDC knew that it had the 
burden of setting aside that settlement agreement before it could proceed with its underlying 
lawsuit. After Mr. Porter made disclosures in compliance with the terms of the settlement 
agreement, PDC was dissatisfied, accused Mr. Porter of fraud in inducing PDC to settle, and 
sought to proceed with a TRO hearing it had requested before the settlement occurred. The 
following discussion took place at hearing on August 14,2001 between PDC's attorney, Mr. 
Ady, and the court: 
THE JUDGE: Well j u s t . . . And I won't quarrel with you. Let 
me just speak freely so I understand what your 
concerns are. 
It would appear to me that you've made an 
agreement and you can enforce it. You can 
request your permanent injunction and then you 
could sue him for fraud. But I don't know if you 
have the right to consider a temporary TRO 
injunctive relief if it's been eclipsed by an 
agreement. 
MR. ADY: 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. ADY: 
THE JUDGE; 
MR. ADY: 
THE JUDGE: 
Well, but at the time that we signed this the 
fraudulent inducement, then the agreement can't 
operate. 
All right. But you need to make a motion then to 
set aside the settlement agreement-
Correct 
- based on his fraud. Is that correct? I would 
assume. 
I would think we do, sir. Yes. 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
R. 737, 24:14-25:10-19. (emphasis added). The court later reiterated, 
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THE JUDGE: Sure. But it's, it's , it's not, it's assumed, it's 
assumed enforceable until I hear a motion on it 
that it would not be. And I haven't received a 
motion on it 
R. 737,36:22-37:2. (emphasis added). Mr. Ady then suggested setting a hearing for PDC's 
motion to set aside: 
MR. ADY Sir, I'm wondering if it wouldn't be useful to 
calendar a date for a hearing for our motion to set 
aside. 
THE JUDGE: Well, my habit frankly is to a, receive those 
motions and read them because sometimes they 
don't require a hearing.... 
R. 737,53:3-8. 
Thus, PDC was aware and had agreed as of August 2001 that its lawsuit 
underlying the settlement could not proceed unless and until it obtained a court order setting 
aside the settlement. Yet, twenty-one months then passed without PDC filing any motion to 
challenge the settlement agreement. It was not until Mr. Porter-tired of the matter lingering 
on and wanting his laptop back and the dismissal of the case for which he bargained—filed 
a motion to enforce the settlement, that PDC then filed a motion to set it aside. 
After denying PDC's motion, the court was critical of PDC's failure to 
prosecute the case: "This case has been inactive for over 2 years even though plaintiff claims 
that material breeches of the settlement agreement by defendant occurred as early as June and 
July of 2001. Plaintiff has offered no explanation for this delay." See the court's November 
30,2003 ruling, R. 648 f 2. PDC, nevertheless, over the next two and one-half years failed 
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to do any of the additional work directed by the court to resolve the issue of whether the 
settlement should be set aside. This period included deadlines set by the court after an order-
to-show-cause hearing, to do discovery on the settlement and file any dispositive motions. 
PDC did nothing on the case and filed no dispositve motion. 
As PDC had failed to meet court deadlines established to challenge the 
settlement during the five-year period since the parties had settled, defendant Porter filed a 
motion to dismiss the case. The motion was unopposed by PDC and the court dismissed the 
case. Again, as stated above, PDC has failed to present any justifiable excuse to the court 
for its failures to prosecute the case, to renew its motion to set aside the settlement within the 
time established by the court, or, as set forth in Point III below, to oppose defendant Porter's 
motion to dismiss. PDC has thus failed to meet its burden on appeal, and the court should 
affirm the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the case. 
Nevertheless, PDC argues that since the court, in November 2003, denied 
defendant Porter's motion to enforce the settlement as well as PDC's motion to set aside, the 
onus was then on Mr. Porter, as much as PDC, to litigate the settlement. This is not correct. 
As quoted above, the posture of the case outlined by the court, and agreed to by PDC, was 
that the settlement had to be set aside before the underlying lawsuit could proceed. Mr. 
Porter had no obligation or interest in litigating anything. He had already incurred much 
more in attorney fees and costs on the matter than he could afford, and his only interest was 
in receiving the benefit of the settlement to which PDC had agreed-releasing his laptop and 
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dismissing the case. R. 732, 15:24-16:24. Once Jared Porter learned that experts would 
have to be hired and a lot more attorney work done to get his laptop back, it was no longer 
cost-effective to try and compel PDC to fulfill its promises. Mr. Porter had no duty to 
prosecute. Mr. Porter was content to wait for PDC to prosecute its challenge to the 
settlement. It was PDC's lawsuit and it had the burden to get an order setting aside the 
settlement. As stated in Country Meadows, u[T]he duty to prosecute is a duty of due 
diligence imposed on a plaintiff, not on a defendant. Country Meadows, at 1216 (citing 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah States Univ. 813 P. 2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App.) 1991. 
Utah appellate courts, where appropriate, have made use of five considerations 
in addition to considering a party's delay, to assist "in assessing the sufficiency of a proffered 
excuse" for lack of diligence which results in dismissal. Country Meadows at 1215, Hartford 
Leasing Corporation v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994), These include, (1) "the 
conduct of both parties"; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the case 
forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward; (4) the difficulty 
or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) "most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Id., Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co,, at 
879, Country Meadows, at 1215 (Utah App. 1993). Application of these factors requires 
consideration of the "'totality of the circumstances'" Country Meadows, at 1215 (quoting 
Department of Social Servs. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)). 
While no analysis of the five considerations is necessary in the case at bar since 
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PDC has offered no excuse for its failure to prosecute, the considerations, nonetheless, are 
helpful to understand the district court's proper exercise of discretion in the case. All five 
factors support the district court's dismissal since the parties had settled and the burden was 
on PDC to challenge and move to set aside the settlement agreement. Thus, under (1), PDC 
did not carry its burden, while defendant Porter did nothing to impede PDC from carrying 
its burden. After two years of doing nothing, PDC finally made a motion in response to Mr. 
Porter's motion. However, when PDC's motion was denied, it took no further action to 
challenge or set aside the settlement, ever. Under (2) and (3), PDC expressed the desire and 
acknowledged its burden to set aside the settlement. It was given ample opportunity to do 
so, but did not act. Mr. Porter, on the other hand, had moved the case to settlement and had 
no desire or obligation to move the case anywhere else. Under (4), defendant Porter had to 
wait over five years for the benefit of the settlement. His laptop computer with all his work 
was unavailable and became obsolete. He had to incur a lot more in costs and attorney fees 
because of PDC's refusal to abide by or promptly seek to set aside the settlement agreement. 
Under (5), there is no injustice to PDC, since it settled the case. While it was dissatisfied 
with the settlement and alleged fraud in inducement, if it really believed that, and wanted to 
do something about it, justice allowed for that. The real injustice has been to defendant 
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Porter, who, due to PDC's conduct, had to wait five years to receive the benefit of the 
settlement.2 
The burden was on PDC to do something about the settlement agreement if it 
really wanted to move forward on its underlying lawsuit. However, PDC did nothing and 
offers no excuse, let alone a justifiable excuse, why it did not act. At the time defendant 
Porter moved to dismiss, five years had passed since the parties had settled and a year had 
passed since the last allotted period for discovery on, and a dispositive motion of the 
settlement. The district court acted properly within its discretion in dismissing the case. 
POINT II 
PDC'S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND PROSECUTE ITS CASE WERE NOT 
MADE MOOT BY PDC'S CERTIFICATE OF 
READINESS FOR TRIAL. 
While PDC has not met its burden on appeal, PDC does make a crafty, albeit 
legally hollow argument that the court could not dismiss its case because of the court's prior 
directive at the April 4, 2006 order-to-show-cause hearing to file a certificate of readiness 
for trial or submit a new scheduling order. The basis for PDC's argument is that, contrary 
2While there is no injustice to PDC, defendant notes, 
"[E]ven where a trial court finds facts indicating that 'injustice could 
result from the dismissal of [a] case,1 it can dismiss when a plaintiff has 
'had more than ample opportunity to prove his [or her] asserted interest 
and simply failed to do so.'" Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App. 109 at 
f28 , 46 P.3d 753, Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216. 
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to the court's statements, the court was not really confused about the status of the parties' last 
stipulated extension; therefore, following the court's directive to file a certificate of readiness 
for trial or a new scheduling order cured PDC's failures to prosecute over the prior five 
years. 
Even were PDC correct that the court was not confused on the extension at the 
April 4, 2006 order-to-show-cause hearing, this would be immaterial. The court made no 
finding at that time that PDC had diligently prosecuted the case, nor did it order that PDC's 
case could not be the subject of a motion to dismiss for its failures. Without knowing much 
at all about the history of the case at that point, the court simply told PDC that the case would 
be dismissed by April 30, 2006, unless it filed a certificate of readiness for trial or a new 
scheduling order. This was a necessary step to avoid dismissal at that time, but in no way 
immunized PDC from dismissal for other reasons. Subsequently, in connection with 
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court reviewed the entire record and based its decision on 
the whole history of the case, not just on the status of one stipulated extension. Furthermore, 
while the district court did not reverse any rulings it had made, contrary to PDC' s arguments, 
a district court retains authority to reverse its prior non-final orders, if it sees fit. Macris v. 
Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, f 29,24 P.3d 984. The court had power to entertain 
and rule on a motion to dismiss, regardless of PDC's filing of a certificate of readiness for 
trial. 
Nonetheless, as the court explained at the August 10,2008 motion-to-dismiss 
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hearing, the court believed that it was under the misimpression at the April 4,2006 hearing, 
that the parties' stipulated extension was still in effect. PDC's Addendum B, R. 732,22:15-
25. The court's mis-impression is confirmed by the transcript of the order-to show-cause 
hearing: 
Okay. And then there's an extension, there's an agreement for an 
extension of time to April 30th in the file, 2005. So looks like you've 
agreed to, to that you have time a, until April 30th to complete 
discovery. That a, stipulated extension remains in place. And a, I'll 
order that a notice of readiness for trial be filed after that. Sounds like 
you have some more time. Then if I don't receive a certificate of 
readiness for trial or some other scheduling order by April 30th the case 
will be dismissed. 
R. 733, p. 6. (Emphasis added). Unfortunately, defense counsel had gone to the case's prior 
courthouse for the April 4, 2006 order-to-show-cause hearing. Otherwise, he could have 
cleared up the confusion, and, as he had intended, presented the history of the case, asked for 
dismissal at that time, and avoided PDC's efforts. 
Having failed to obtain a court order setting aside the settlement agreement, 
after the order-to-show-cause hearing, PDC sought to exploit the situation and do an "end-
run" around the settlement agreement and the entire civil litigation process. To defendant's 
surprise, PDC filed a certificate of readiness for trial, representing that (1) all required 
pleadings had been filed and the case was at issue as to all parties, (2) counsel had completed 
all discovery, and (3) settlement discussions had been "pursued", but that no settlement had 
taken place. R. 643. Mr. Porter then filed an objection to the certificate of readiness for 
trial and his motion to dismiss. RR. 682-644. Mr. Porter pointed out that all three of 
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Plaintiffs assertions were false, that the case had settled, that PDC had never obtained an 
order setting aside the settlement, and because of that, PDC's underlying claims had never 
been litigated, no answer to the complaint had been filed, PDC had never scheduled a Rule 
26 planning meeting as would be its duty, there had been no initial disclosures, no scheduling 
order, and no opportunity for discovery or motions on the merits of plaintiff s lawsuit. RR. 
682, 680. The only discovery that had occurred in the case was pursuant to the settlement 
agreement and it consisted of defendant's 14-hour deposition to make disclosures in 
compliance with the settlement. 
In any event, all of PDC's arguments about the certificate of readiness for trial 
are irrelevant to the appeal at bar. As set forth above, the trial court did not base its decision 
to dismiss the case on the veracity of PDC's statements in the certificate, but on the thorough 
review of the record and findings in connection with Plaintiffs motion to dismiss. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ACTED WITHIN 
ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PDC'S COMPLAINT 
FOR FAILURE TO OPPOSE DEFENDANT PORTER'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Rule 41(b), as quoted above, not only provides dismissal for failure to abide 
by court orders and prosecute, but for failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. PDC had the duty to timely oppose Mr. Porter's motion to dismiss. Rule 7(c)(1), 
Utah R. Civ. P., provides in pertinent part: 
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Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum 
in opposition. 
(emphasis added). 
PDC failed to oppose the motion to dismiss and has failed on appeal to meet 
its burden of showing a justifiable excuse for that failure. Further, PDC has never denied 
receiving the motion to dismiss and memorandum in support, and there is no doubt that PDC 
did receive them. See RR. 689-683, 682-673. As set forth in the authorities quoted and 
cited above, a district court has discretion to dismiss under Rule 41(b). All this was 
explained during the August 10, 2006 hearing on the motion to dismiss: 
You're also well within the law and discretion to dismiss it because my 
motion to dismiss was unopposed by, by the plaintiff. We're here today 
on that. I filed it three months ago. I mailed it to him, I faxed it to him, 
I sent him a letter. He had every opportunity to challenge that motion 
to dismiss but he didn't do it. So there's a second independent reason 
you're well within the law and equity here to dismiss this case. And, 
therefore, I would ask you to dismiss it. 
PDC's Addendum B, R. 732, p. 9. 
PDC and its attorney knew what was at stake in ignoring a motion to dismiss. 
PDC's failure to respond was an admission of Mr. Porter's assertions that PDC had failed 
to timely challenge the settlement and prosecute its case. As PDC has failed to offer a 
justifiable excuse or show a clear abuse of the district court's discretion, the court should 
uphold the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the case on this additional 
ground. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court should uphold the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing 
plaintiff PDC's complaint. PDC has failed to meet its burden on appeal of showing a 
justifiable excuse for its failures to timely challenge the parties' settlement agreement, obtain 
a court order setting it aside, and prosecute its case. PDC has also failed to meet its burden 
of showing a justifiable excuse for not timely opposing defendant Jared Porter's motion to 
dismiss. PDC has failed in its burden to show that the district court clearly abused its broad 
discretion in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, defendant Jared Porter respectfully requests that the Utah 
Court of Appeals uphold the district court's proper exercise of discretion in dismissing the 
case. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this ^ _ day of A p ^ 1 , 2008. 
/ i •: 
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